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Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions
and Annuities
Jonathan Barry Forman*
INTRODUCTION
A number of recent proposals would curtail the current
federal income tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and
individual retirement accounts (IRAs). For example, in his 2014
Federal Budget, President Barack Obama proposed an overall
cap on the total amount that individuals could accumulate in
their tax-favored retirement plans.1 More specifically, once an
individual had accumulated enough to provide an annuity of
$205,000 a year starting at age sixty-two (about $3.4 million in
2013), the proposal would prohibit further contributions.2
Similarly, in 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal
Responsibility and Reform (co-chaired by Erskine Bowles and
former Senator Alan Simpson) proposed an annual cap on
retirement contributions.3 The proposal would cap the total
employer and employee retirement plan contributions at the
lesser of 20% of the employee’s compensation or $20,000.4 This
Article considers the merits of these and other proposals to limit
the tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs.
Part I of this Article explains how the current tax system
provides favorable tax treatment for annuities, pensions, and
IRAs. Part II then discusses a number of proposals to curtail that

* Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973,
Northwestern University; M.A. (Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978,
University of Michigan; M.A. (Economics) 1983, George Washington University; Professor
in Residence at the Internal Revenue Service Office of Chief Counsel, Washington, D.C.
for the 2009–2010 academic year; Member of the Board of Trustees of the Oklahoma
Public Employees Retirement System, 2003–2011. Copyright © 2014, Jonathan Barry
Forman.
1 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION ’ S
FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 165–66 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf.
2 Id.
3 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 31
fig. 7 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/
files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
4 Id.
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favorable tax treatment. Finally, Part III considers the important
issues raised by those proposals.
I. THE CURRENT FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM PROVIDES FAVORABLE TAX
TREATMENT FOR ANNUITIES, PENSIONS, AND INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
Under the current federal income tax system, investment
income is generally subject to federal personal income tax rates
of up to 39.6% in 2014;5 however, dividend income and capital
gains are generally taxed at no more than a 20% rate.6 This Part
explains how the current tax system also provides favorable tax
treatment for annuities, pensions, and IRAs.7
A. Annuities
An annuity is a financial instrument (e.g., an insurance
contract) that converts a lump sum of money into a stream of
income payable over a period of years, typically for life.8
Pertinent here, annuities are often used to provide lifetime
retirement income.9 For example, for a sixty-five-year-old man
who purchased a $100,000 immediate, level-payment lifetime
annuity, without inflation protection, as of January 1, 2014, the
annual payout would be around $6864 or 6.86% of the annuity’s
purchase price.10 Because women tend to live longer than men,
the annual payout for a sixty-five-year-old woman who elected an
immediate, level-payment lifetime annuity, as of January 1,
2014, would be just $6408 or 6.41% of the annuity’s purchase
price.11
I.R.C. § 1 (2012); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537.
I.R.C. § 1(h).
There are tax advantages associated with many other investments. For example,
home mortgage interest is generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a personal
residence are often excludable. I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 121. Interest on state and local bonds is
exempt from tax. I.R.C. § 103. Insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death of the
insured are exempt from tax. I.R.C. § 101(a). Also, gains are not typically taxed until they
are realized. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a). Moreover, if property is held until death, the basis
in the property often “steps up” to its fair market value, which means that the
appreciation is never taxed. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
8 See JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL N. SHAVIRO & KIRK J. STARK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 117 (16th ed. 2012). The person holding an annuity is called an annuitant. Id.
9 See, e.g., Farrell Dolan, Applying the 4-Box Strategy to Retirement Income
Planning: Generating a Lifetime of Income, LIMRA’S MARKETFACTS Q., Fall 2009, at 84,
88, available at http://pjwalkercommunications.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/MarketFacts.pdf; Darla Mercado, Making the Case for Annuities, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 25,
2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120325/REG/303259969&iss
uedate=20120323&sid=RI0326.
10 Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER, Jan. 2014, at 9, 18 tbl.5,
available at www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2014-01.pdf ($6864 =
$572 × 12).
11 Id. ($6408 = $534 × 12).
5
6
7
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The income tax system provides very favorable tax treatment
of investments in annuities.12 Although the value of an annuity
investment grows over time, no tax is imposed until annuity
distributions commence. In short, there is no tax on the so-called
“inside buildup” until the “annuity starting date.” Even then, the
annuitant can exclude a fraction of each benefit payment from
income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the
amount of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the
individual. The exclusion ratio enables the individual to recover
her own after-tax contributions tax-free and to pay tax only on
the remaining portion of benefits which represents income.
This deferral of taxation until benefits are actually received
is a very valuable tax benefit (i.e., compared to say, a regular
bank account where the interest income is taxed on an annual
basis13). For example, according to the Joint Committee on
Taxation, the exclusion of investment income on annuity (and life
insurance) contracts will result in a tax expenditure of more than
$30 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and more than $150 billion over
five years.14
B. Pension Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
The United States has a voluntary pension system, and
employers have considerable choice about whether and how to
provide pension benefits to their employees.15 However, when
employers do provide pensions, those pensions are typically
subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).16

See I.R.C. § 72.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2017, at 35 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2013),
available at https://www.jct.gov/ publications.html?func=startdown&id=4503; see also
infra Table 2.
15 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost of
“Choice” in a Voluntary Pension System, N.Y.U. REV. EMP . BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION, 2013, at 6-1, 6-3.
16 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
864 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (Supp. III 1997) and in scattered
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 112TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE TAX
TREATMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (Comm. Print 2012), available at
https://www.jct.gov/ publications.html?func=startdown&id=4418 (“These plans afford
employers flexibility in the design and structure of the retirement plans they adopt,
subject to . . . [ERISA].”).
12
13
14

Do Not Delete

224

10/13/2014 4:23 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

1. Retirement Savings are Tax-Favored
Most retirement savings qualify for even more generous tax
treatment than annuities. For example, employer contributions
to a pension are not taxable to the employee;17 the pension fund’s
earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt;18 and retirees
pay tax only when they receive distributions of their pension
benefits.19 Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current
deduction for its contributions (within limits).20
More specifically, pension benefits may be fully taxable or
partially taxable, depending on whether the employee made any
after-tax contributions. For example, an employee’s pension
benefits will be fully taxable if the employee’s employer
contributed all of the cost for the pension without any of the cost
being included in the employee’s taxable wages.21
On the other hand, if an employee made after-tax
contributions to a pension, she can exclude a fraction of each
benefit payment from income.22 As with regular annuities, that
fraction—the “exclusion ratio”—is based on the amount of
premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the employee,
and this approach enables the employee to recover her own
after-tax contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the
remaining portion of benefits which represents income.23
Taxpayers who begin receiving annuity payments from a
pension plan after November 18, 1996, generally use the
Simplified Method to figure the tax-free part of the payments.24
Under the Simplified Method, the Internal Revenue Code
provides a table with a fixed number of anticipated payments
that depends upon the annuitant’s age as of the annuity starting
date. The taxpayer then divides the total cost over the applicable
number of anticipated payments and excludes the amount so
determined each year. For example, if the annuity is payable
over the life of a single individual, the number of anticipated
payments is determined as follows:

I.R.C. § 402.
I.R.C. § 501(a).
I.R.C. §§ 72, 402. See generally I.R.S. Publication No. 575 (Jan. 2, 2014), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf.
20 I.R.C. § 404.
21 I.R.S. Publication No. 575, supra note 19, at 11. Pension benefits would also be
fully taxable if the participant has already received all of her previously taxed
contributions tax free in previous years. Id.
22 I.R.C. §§ 72, 402.
23 See supra Part I.A.
24 I.R.S. Publication No. 575, supra note 19, at 11–15.
17
18
19
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55 or under
56–60
61–65
66–70
71 or older
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Number of anticipated payments
360
310
260
210
160

If the annuity is payable over two lives, the number of
anticipated payments is determined as follows:
Combined ages at annuity
starting date
110 or under
111–120
121–130
131–140
141 or older

Number of anticipated payments
410
360
310
260
210

Also, since 2006, employers have been permitted to set up
so-called “Roth 401(k) plans.”25 Contributions to these plans are
not excludable, but neither the plan’s investment returns nor
distributions are taxable.
Favorable tax rules are also available for IRAs.26 Almost any
worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other financial
institution. In 2014, individuals without pension plans can
contribute and deduct up to $5500 to a regular IRA, although
individuals over age 50 can contribute and deduct another $1,000
(for a total of up to $6500); and spouses can contribute and
deduct similar amounts.27
Since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth
IRAs.28 Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not
deductible. Instead, withdrawals are tax free. Like regular IRAs,
however, Roth IRA earnings are tax exempt.

I.R.C. § 402A; see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. § 219; I.R.S. Publication No. 590 (Jan. 5, 2014), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-pdf/p590.pdf.
27 See I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 (Oct. 31, 2013), available at http://www.irs.
gov/uac/IRS-Announces-2014-Pension-Plan-Limitations;-Taxpayers-May-Contribute-up-to
-$17,500-to-their-401(k)-plans-in-2014.
28 I.R.C. § 408A.
25
26
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Finally, since 2002, certain low- and moderate-income
individuals have been able to claim a non-refundable tax credit of
up to $1000 for certain qualified retirement savings
contributions.29 The credit equals a percentage (50%, 20%, or
10%) of up to $2000 of contributions.30 In effect, the credit acts
like an employer match: the government matches a portion of the
employee’s contributions.
2. Types of Pension Plans
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based
on the nature of the benefits provided: defined benefit plans and
defined contribution plans.
a. Defined benefit plans
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a
specific benefit at retirement.31 For example, a plan might
provide that a worker’s annual retirement benefit (B) is equal to
2% times the number of years of service (yos) times final average
compensation (fac) (B = 2% × yos × fac). Under this traditional,
final-average-pay formula, a worker who retires after thirty
years of service with final average compensation of $50,000
would receive a pension of $30,000 a year for life ($30,000 = 2% ×
30 yos × $50,000 fac).32 While many defined benefit plans allow
for lump sum distributions, the default benefit for defined benefit
plans is a retirement income stream in the form of a lifetime
annuity.33
b. Defined contribution plans
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer
simply withholds a specified percentage of the worker’s
compensation, which it contributes to an individual investment

I.R.C. § 25B.
Id.
Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions,
25 OKLA. C ITY U. L. REV. 379, 385 (2000). To provide that benefit, the employer typically
makes payments into a trust fund, contributed funds grow with investment returns, and
eventually the employer withdraws funds from the trust fund to pay the promised
benefits. Id. Employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer
bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Id. at 385–86.
32 Id. at 386. Final average compensation is often computed by averaging the
worker’s salary over the last three or five years prior to retirement. Id. Alternatively,
some plans use career-average compensation instead of final-average compensation.
Under a career earnings formula, benefits are based on a percentage of an average of
career earnings for every year of service by the employee. Id.
33 In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide
annuities, i.e., “definitely determinable benefits . . . over a period of years, usually for life,
after retirement.” Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 2014).
29
30
31
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account for the worker.34 For example, contributions might be set
at 10% of annual compensation.35 Under such a plan, a worker
who earned $50,000 in a given year would have $5000
contributed to an individual investment account for her
($5000 = 10% × $50,000).36 Her benefit at retirement would be
based on all such contributions plus investment earnings.37
Unlike traditional defined benefit plans, defined contribution
plans usually make distributions in the form of lump-sum or
periodic distributions rather than lifetime annuities.
There are a variety of different types of defined contribution
plans, including money purchase pension plans, profit-sharing
plans, stock bonus plans, target benefit plans, and employee
stock ownership plans (ESOPs).38 Profit-sharing and stock bonus
plans often include a feature that allows workers to choose
between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing
the money in a retirement account, according to Internal
Revenue Code section 401(k). Consequently, these plans are often
called “401(k) plans,” and they are the most popular type of
retirement plan in the United States.39 The maximum annual
amount of such elective deferrals that can be made by an
individual in 2014 is $17,500, although workers over the age of
50 can contribute another $5500 (for a total of up to $23,000).40
Similar limits apply to Roth 401(k) plans.41
c. Hybrid retirement plans
So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of
defined benefit and defined contribution plans.42 For example, a
cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that looks like a
defined contribution plan.43

Forman & Nixon, supra note 31, at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. Defined contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans
because each worker has her own account, as opposed to defined benefit plans, where the
plan’s assets are pooled for the benefit of all of the employees. Id.
38 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Six Ways to Save for Retirement,
PROGRAM PERSP., Mar. 2011, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/
program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf.
39 See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Examines Popular 401(k)
Retirement Plans, PROGRAM PERSP., Nov. 2010, at 1, 1, available at http://www.bls.gov/
opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf.
40 I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86, supra note 27.
41 Id.; I.R.C. § 402A (2012).
42 Forman & Nixon, supra note 31, at 387.
43 Id. Like other defined benefit plans, employer contributions are based on actuarial
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Like
defined contribution plans, however, cash balance plans provide workers with individual
accounts (albeit hypothetical). Id. A simple cash balance plan might allocate 10% of salary
34
35
36
37
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C. The Economics of Tax Deferral
The basic tax advantage of annuities, pension plans, and
IRAs is tax deferral. For example, Table 1 shows the value of the
tax advantages associated with saving in a regular pension plan
(or IRA), as compared with saving in a regular savings account. 44
A regular savings account is funded with deposits that come from
after-tax income and accumulate only at an annual after-tax
interest rate—that is, the interest or investment income earned
in such an account is taxed annually. The table assumes that a
person age forty-five has $1000 in wages and wishes to save it for
fifteen years for purposes of retirement at age sixty. The market
interest rate during the full fifty years is assumed to be 8%.
TABLE 1. TAX ADVANTAGES OF A $1000 CONTRIBUTION TO A
REGULAR PENSION PLAN
Example 1: Tax Rate of
15% in Working Years

Contribution
Tax on contribution
Deposit
Value at withdrawal
Retirement tax rate (%)
Tax on withdrawal
Net withdrawal
Gain over regular account
Percent gain
Alternative retirement tax rate (%)
Tax on withdrawal
Net withdrawal
Gain over regular account
Percent gain

Example 2: Tax Rate of
40% in Working Years

Regular
Account
$1000
150
850
2280
___
0
2280
___
___

Qualified
Plan
$1000
___
1000
3172
15
476
2696
416
18

Regular
Account
$1000
400
600
1212
___
0
1212
___
___

Qualified
Plan
$1000
___
600
3172
40
1269
1903
691
57

___
0
2280
___
___

0
0
3172
892
39

___
0
1212
___
___

30
952
2221
1008
83

Sources: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX POLICY FOR PENSIONS AND OTHER
RETIREMENT SAVING 4 tbl.1 (1987), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/50xx/doc5011/doc05-entire.pdf; JOHN H. LANGBEIN,
SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW
336 (4th ed. 2006).

to each worker’s account each year and credit the account with 5% interest on the balance
in the account. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given year would get
an annual cash balance credit of $5000 ($5000 = 10% × $50,000), plus an interest credit
equal to 5% of the balance in her hypothetical account as of the beginning of the year. Id.
at 386.
44 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE , TAX POLICY FOR PENSIONS AND OTHER RETIREMENT
SAVING 4 tbl.1 (1987), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
50xx/doc5011/doc05-entire.pdf; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 336 (4th ed. 2006).
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Consider Example 2 in Table 1. The example assumes that
the employee is a high-income individual in the 40% income tax
bracket when working and when retired. If the $1000 is paid
directly to the employee, the employee would immediately pay
$400 in tax and deposit $600 after tax into the savings account.
That $600 savings account would earn 8% interest, but the
after-tax rate of return would be just 4.8%. The $600 in the
account compounded at 4.8% interest over fifteen years would
yield $1212, which could be withdrawn tax free.
If the employer had instead contributed that $1000 to a
regular pension plan, the full $1000 would have compounded at
the 8% pretax rate and yield $3172 at the end of fifteen years.
Upon withdrawal, that $3172 would all be taxed at the
employee’s 40% income tax rate, leaving the employee with
$1903 after tax. That is a net gain of $691 (57%) over the regular
savings account.
The examples in Table 1 show the economic advantages of
regular pension plans and IRAs over regular savings accounts.
The tax advantages are greatest for those in the highest tax
brackets in their working years. There are also even greater
advantages to deferring income for longer periods.
Contributions to Roth IRAs and Roth 401(k) plans are made
after-tax; however, withdrawals are tax free. Accordingly, these
arrangements offer essentially the same tax economic benefits as
qualified plans and traditional IRAs. For example, following
Example 2 in Table 1, assume that an employee in the 40% tax
bracket paid $400 tax on $1000 of earnings and contributed the
remaining $600 to a Roth IRA with an 8% tax-free interest rate.
After fifteen years, that investment would be worth $1903,
exactly what the employee would have had with the regular
pension plan.
D. Current Estimates of the Tax Expenditures Associated with
Annuities, Pensions, and IRAs
As more fully discussed in Part III below, the special tax
rules for annuities, pensions, and IRAs are routinely identified as
“tax expenditures” in the tax expenditure budgets prepared
annually by the Office of Management and Budget and by the
Joint Committee on Taxation.45 Policymakers often use these tax
expenditure estimates as a rough guide to the cost of these

45 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 205
tbl.14-1 (2014); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14.
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special income tax provisions.46 For example, Table 2 reproduces
the Office of Management and Budget’s 2015 Federal Budget
estimates of the revenue losses attributable to the special income
tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs.47 All in all, these
tax expenditures are quite large. In fact, two of these items are
among the top ten largest tax expenditures each year, and five
are in the top twenty.48
TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF TOTAL INCOME TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019
2015

2019

2015–19

23,040

24,690 26,370 28,180 30,090

132,370

Net exclusion of pension
contributions & earnings:
Defined benefit plans

42,340

44,750 47,270 49,160 51,440

234,960

Defined contribution plans

61,050

77,020 88,740 92,770 94,820

414,400

IRAs

17,480

18,540 19,630 20,650 21,720

98,020

Exclusion of interest on
insurance & annuities

Savers tax credit
Self-Employed plans

1210
25,530

2016

1260

2017

1300

2018

1280

1300

6350

28,100 30,890 33,860 37,150

155,530

Source: OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. O FFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 205 tbl.14-1 (2014).

II. MANY PROPOSALS WOULD CURTAIL THE FAVORABLE TAX
TREATMENT FOR ANNUITIES, PENSIONS, AND INDIVIDUAL
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
This Part summarizes a variety of recent proposals to limit
the tax benefits associated with annuities and pensions.49 Some
of these proposals have been around for decades, and some are
relatively recent.
46 “Admittedly, however, tax expenditure estimates do not necessarily equal the
increase in Federal revenues that would result from repealing the special provisions.”
Jonathan Barry Forman, Comparing Apples and Oranges: Some Thoughts on the Pension
and Social Security Tax Expenditures, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 297, 308 n.50 (2001).
47 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 45, at
205 tbl.14-1, 206, 208.
48 Id. at 216 tbl.14-3.
49 See also Tax Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing/?id=ba387157-5056-a032-5252-c7bf71fc6c90; Jack VanDerhei, Tax
Reform Options: Promoting Retirement Security, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Nov. 2011, at
1, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_11-2011_No364_RetTaxRfm2
.pdf.
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A. Include Investment Income from Annuities (and Life
Insurance) in Taxable Income
Perhaps the oldest tax reform proposal that still has
currency is the suggestion that we should include the investment
income from annuities (and life insurance) in taxable income.50
Under a comprehensive income tax (i.e., a theoretically pure
income tax), individuals would pay tax on the sum of the wages,
interest, dividends, and other forms of economic income that they
earn.51 As more fully explained below, this proposal would extend
comprehensive income tax treatment to annuities (and life
insurance) by taxing the inside buildup in those policies.52
Portions of the premiums paid for annuities are invested and
earn interest, dividends, and other types of investment income.
That investment income—the inside buildup—is generally not
taxable until the annuitant begins receiving annuity
distributions. A similar deferral of tax occurs on investments in
whole-life insurance policies.53 Under a pure income tax,
investors in these insurance products would be taxed on those
investment earnings annually, just like investors in bank
accounts, taxable bonds, and mutual funds. According to the
Joint Committee on Taxation, including the investment income

50 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4664, OPTIONS FOR REDUCING THE
DEFICIT: 2014 TO 2023, at 126 tbl. (2013), available at www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf; DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE
U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 178 (2d ed. 1984).
51 The classic economic definition of income (also known as the Haig-Simons
definition of income) is as follows:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In
other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the
period to “wealth” at the end of the period and then subtracting “wealth” at the
beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain, as our courts have recognized in
their more lucid moments—and gain to someone during a specified time
interval. Moreover, this gain may be measured and defined most easily by
positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption and accumulation, each of
which may be estimated in a common unit by appeal to market prices.
HENRY C. SIMONS , PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income—
Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed.,
1921). See generally BROOKINGS INST., COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A.
Pechman ed., 1977); BROOKINGS INST., WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR
EXPENDITURE? 50–51 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); Henry Aaron, What Is a
Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway? 22 NAT ’L TAX J. 543 (1969); DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE
U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, supra note 50.
52 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 50.
53 Id. A whole-life insurance policy provides life insurance coverage throughout the
insured’s whole life, as opposed to term-life insurance, which provides coverage for a
specified period. Id.

Do Not Delete

232

10/13/2014 4:23 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

from annuities and life insurance in taxable income would raise
$24 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and $210 billion over ten years.54
B. Cap the Total Accumulation of Retirement Benefits
In his 2014 Federal Budget, President Barack Obama
proposed an overall cap on the total amount that individuals
could accumulate in their tax-favored retirement plans.55 More
specifically, once an individual had accumulated enough to
provide a joint and survivor annuity of $205,000 a year, starting
at age sixty-two, the proposal would prohibit further
contributions under such plans. The maximum annuity cap was
designed to equal the maximum annuity that can be paid by a
qualified defined benefit plan ($205,000 in 2013 and $210,000 in
2014),56 and the Treasury estimated that the maximum
permitted accumulation for an individual in 2013 was around
$3.4 million.57
Pertinent here, during the 2012 Presidential race, Governor
Mitt Romney was reported to have accumulated $87 million in
his IRA,58 and proposals like this seem to be intended to curtail
such large accumulations. The Joint Committee on Taxation
estimates that this Obama Administration proposal would raise
$210 million in Fiscal Year 2015 and $3.8 billion over ten years. 59
In fact, the Obama Administration’s proposal calls for a
combined limit on defined benefit plans and individual account
plans (i.e., defined contribution plans and IRAs). That is, further
contributions would be limited for participants whose total
individual account balances plus their defined benefit plans
would be sufficient to provide the maximum allowable annuity
(e.g., $210,000 a year for a sixty-two-year-old in 2014). To avoid
54 Id.; see also supra Table 2 (showing slightly different tax expenditure estimates,
$23 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and $132 billion over five years).
55 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 166; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 113TH CONG., D ESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PRESIDENT ’S F ISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL 144 (Comm. Print 2013), available
at
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4538.
“[T]ax-favored
retirement plans include traditional IRAs (including SEPs and SIMPLE IRAs), Roth
IRAs, qualified retirement plans [(e.g., I.R.C. § 401(k) plans)], [I.R.C. §] 403(b) plans, and
governmental [I.R.C. §] 457(b) plans.” Id.
56 I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) (2012); I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86, supra note 27.
57 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 1, at 166.
58 Tom Hamburger, Mitt Romney Exited Bain Capital with Rare Tax Benefits in
Retirement, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mittromney-exited-bain-capital-with-rare-tax-benefits-in-retirement/2012/09/02/1bddc8de-ec8
5-11e1-a80b-9f898562d010_story.html.
59 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET
EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2014
BUDGET PROPOSAL [1], at 8 (Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=4520.
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the complexity that can result from administering such a
combined limit on individuals who participate in both defined
benefit and individual account plans,60 John Turner and his
colleagues have suggested that it would be simpler to have a
separate $5 million cap just for individual account plans.61
Turner and his colleagues further recommend that individuals
with balances in excess of that $5 million cap should be required
to take taxable distributions from their plans equal to the excess
over that $5 million cap.62
C. Cap Contributions at the Lesser of 20% of Compensation or
$20,000
In 2010, the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility
and Reform (co-chaired by Erskine Bowles and Senator Alan
Simpson) suggested an annual cap on retirement contributions.63
The proposal would cap the total employer and employee
retirement plan contributions at the lesser of 20% of the
employee’s compensation or $20,000.64 This so-called “20/20”
proposal, which would limit the ability of high-income individuals
to use retirement tax expenditures, was offered as a part of the
Commission’s larger plan to raise revenue in order to cut deficits
and reduce marginal tax rates.
Needless to say, the 20/20 proposal has had plenty of
critics.65 Critics are particularly concerned that capping
contributions would limit the incentives that business owners

60 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 99-44 (1999), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-9944.pdf; ANN TRICHILO & MARTY PIPPINS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CHAPTER 8B—ISSUES
RELATED TO THE REPEAL OF IRC SECTION 415(e) (2002), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/epch8b02.pdf (discussing the repeal of former I.R.C. section 415(e),
which had provided complicated limits on individuals who participated in both defined
benefit and defined contribution plans); Louis T. Mazawey, Practical Ways to Deal with
the Repeal of Section 415(e), 16 PRAC. TAX LAW. 41 (2001), available at http://files.
ali-cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/lacidoirep/articles/PTL_MAZAWEY-01-924_thumb.pdf.
61 See, e.g., John A. Turner, David D. McCarthy & Norman P. Stein, Defined
Contribution Plans with Very Large Individual Account Balances, 1 J. RETIREMENT 113,
120 (2014).
62 Id.; see also Brendan McFarland & Sylvester J. Schieber, Proposed Lifetime
Pension Limits: Less than Meets the Eye, TOWERS WATSON (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.towerswatson.com/en/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/Insider/2014/proposed-li
fetime-pension-limits-less-than-meets-the-eye.
63 NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 3.
64 Id.; see also Jack VanDerhei, Capping Tax-Preferred Retirement Contributions:
Preliminary Evidence of the Impact of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility
and Reform Recommendations, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., July 2011, at 2, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_07_July-11.TaxCap_UnionHI.pdf.
65 See, e.g., AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, “20/20” CAP ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS WOULD
UNDERMINE RETIREMENT SECURITY (2012), available at http://www.americanbenefits
council.org/documents2012/401k-limits_2020-talkingpoints110612.pdf.
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and managers would have to offer retirement plans that today
cover so many rank-and-file workers.
Along the same lines, the Congressional Budget Office
recently outlined a proposal to reduce the current limits on
annual contributions to retirement plans.66 Under the proposal,
the maximum individual contribution would be limited to
$15,500 per year for 401(k)-type plans and $5000 per year for
IRAs; and the proposal would also limit the total of employee and
employer contributions to defined contribution plans to $46,000.67
This proposal would raise $6.7 billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and
around $89 billion over ten years.68
D. Move Towards (or Away from) the Roth Model
A number of reform proposals have called for the pension
system to move either towards or away from the Roth model.
Recall that with a traditional IRA, individuals can deduct their
contributions, but distributions are taxable; on the other hand,
with a Roth IRA, contributions are not deductible, but
distributions are tax-free.69 If the tax rate is the same at both
times, these two tax benefits are equivalent. In the real world,
however, tax rates are not the same at both times, and critics of
the Roth approach generally note that giving taxpayers a choice
almost certainly means that the Treasury will lose revenue as
taxpayers choose which approach is best for them. On the other
hand, supporters of the Roth approach often see Roths as a way
of encouraging low-income workers to save for retirement.
Allowing individuals to convert their traditional IRAs into Roth
IRAs by recognizing income now has also been a way to raise
revenue during the near-term five- and ten-year budget windows
that Congress uses to reach its revenue targets.70
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp’s
recent tax reform proposals come down in favor of Roths,
apparently as a way of raising revenue in order to lower

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 50, at 133–34.
Id. Under current law, the total of employer and employee contributions to a
defined contribution plan cannot exceed $52,000 in 2014. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A) (2012);
I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-86 , supra note 27.
68 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 50, at 133–34.
69 See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Richard Rubin & Margaret Collins, Tax Break for Roth IRA Conversion
Attracted 10% of High Earners, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.bus
inessweek.com/news/2014-01-04/tax-break-for-roth-ira-conversion-attracted-10-percent-ofhigh-earners; Deborah L. Jacobs, Why--and How--Congress Should Curb Roth IRAs,
FORBES (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/03/ 26/why-andhow-congress-should-curb-roth-iras; Leonard E. Burman, Roth Conversions as Revenue
Raisers: Smoke and Mirrors, 111 TAX NOTES 953 (2006).
66
67

Do Not Delete

10/13/2014 4:23 PM

2014] Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions and Annuities

235

marginal tax rates. Under one of his tax reform proposals, “the
income eligibility limits for contributing to Roth IRAs would be
eliminated”; at the same time, however, “new contributions to
traditional IRAs” would be prohibited.71 The proposal would
increase revenues by $14.8 billion over the next ten years.72
Similarly, under another provision, employees would generally be
able to contribute no more than half of the maximum elective
deferral amount ($8750 = 1/2 of $17,500 in 2014) into a
traditional 401(k) plan; anything more would have to go into a
Roth 401(k); and this proposal would raise $143.7 billion over the
next ten years.73
President Barack Obama recently proposed that the
government offer no-fee starter retirement savings accounts
known as “myRAs” (short for “My Retirement Accounts”) that
would be taxed like Roth IRAs: earnings generally could be
withdrawn tax free after age fifty-nine-and-a-half.74 Participants
in these new accounts would earn interest at the same variable
interest rate as the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)
Government Securities Investment Fund.75
President George W. Bush also favored Roth-style retirement
accounts. From 2004 through 2009, his Federal Budgets
recommended consolidating traditional and Roth IRAs into
so-called Retirement Savings Accounts (RSAs) that would be
taxed liked Roth IRAs.76
On the other hand, President Obama’s 2015 Budget would
limit the tax deferral benefits of Roth plans by requiring them to
follow the same required minimum distribution (RMD) rules that
apply to other retirement accounts.77 That is, like qualified plans
and regular IRAs, individuals would generally have to begin
taking RMDs from when they reach age seventy-and-a-half.78

71 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS , 113TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014
DISCUSSION DRAFT SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY 36 (2014), available at http://ways
andmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_section_sumary_final_02
2614.pdf.
72 Id. at 37.
73 Id. at 39–40.
74 See U.S. DEP ’T OF THE TREASURY, MYRA: A SIMPLE, SAFE, AFFORDABLE
RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNT (2014), available at http://www.treasurydirect.gov/ready
savegrow/start_saving/retirementaccountfactsheetenglish.pdf.
75 Id.
76 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 16 at 59.
77 OFFICE OF MGMT . & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 26–27 (2014), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/budget.pdf.
78 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 251–52 (2014), available at http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2015.pdf.
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The proposal would raise $484 million over ten years.79 This
change could make Roth accounts and Roth conversions much
less attractive.80
E. Replace the Current Exclusion with a Refundable Tax Credit
Over the years, there have been a number of proposals to
replace the current exclusions (and deductions) for retirement
savings with tax credits. For example, in 2011, William Gale of
the Brookings Institution suggested that we replace the current
system of exclusions and deductions with a flat-rate refundable
tax credit, given to the employee, with that credit being directly
deposited in the employee’s retirement account.81 For example,
instead of allowing an employee to exclude or deduct her
retirement contributions, a 30% credit would be deposited into
her individual account. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center
estimates that this proposal would be revenue-neutral over ten
years: it would take tax benefits from high-income households
and increase benefits for low- and moderate-income households.82
Along these lines, over the years, there have been a variety
of proposals to limit the value of certain tax expenditures. For
example, the tax system could limit the value of itemized
deductions and exclusions to, say, 28% of their total value.83
Then, taxpayers in income tax brackets with statutory rates
above 28% would receive less benefit from itemized deductions
and exclusions than under current law, while taxpayers in lower
tax brackets would be unaffected by the change. This type of 28%
limit could be applied to the exclusion for 401(k)-type
contributions and to the deduction for IRA contributions.

Id. at 284.
See Jeffrey Levine, Required Minimum Distributions for Roth IRAs?, FIN. PLAN.
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.financial-planning.com/blogs/required-minimum-distributionsfor-roth-2688468-1.html.
81 WILLIAM G. GALE, TAX REFORM OPTIONS: PROMOTING RETIREMENT SECURITY 5
(2011), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20of%20William
%20Gale.pdf (testimony submitted to the United States Senate Committee on Finance).
82 Id. at 6.
83 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 78, at 154–55; CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 50, at 121. Similarly, President George Bush’s recent Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform recommended replacing most itemized deductions with a 15% tax
credit. THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA ’S TAX SYSTEM 102 (2005), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/upload/Tax-Panel-2.pdf.
79
80
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III. PROPOSALS TO IMPOSE TOUGH LIMITS ON THE TAX BENEFITS
FOR ANNUITIES, PENSIONS, AND IRAS WOULD RAISE REVENUE
THAT COULD BE USED TO SUBSIDIZE LOW- AND
MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS
Advocates of imposing tougher limits on the tax benefits for
annuities, pensions, and IRAs tend to be interested in raising
revenue for deficit reduction, for cuts in marginal tax rates, or for
subsidies for low- and moderate-income households. This Part
discusses some of the underlying issues.
A. The Favorable Tax Rules for Annuities, Pensions, and IRAs
Are Costly
As already mentioned, under a theoretically pure income tax,
individuals would pay tax annually on all of their investment
income.84 Of course, the federal income tax deviates from that
comprehensive income tax ideal in a number of ways. In fact, the
current federal tax system is really a hybrid income-consumption
tax system in which some investments are taxed on the income
tax model and others are taxed under the consumption tax model
(i.e., as taxpayers spend their money).85 Pertinent here, for
example, the current taxation of pensions deviates from the
income tax ideal in that employer contributions are typically
excluded from gross income, and pension fund earnings are
exempt from tax.
In that regard, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Act of 1974 requires the federal government to keep track of the
revenue “lost” as a result of deviations from an ideal income tax
through so-called tax expenditure budgets.86 More specifically,
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 defines
“tax expenditures” as: “those revenue losses attributable to
provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special
exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of
tax liability . . . .”87
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 1
(Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1988); Edward J. McCaffery,
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1152 (1992).
In general, wages, interest, dividends, and other forms of income are taxed when received,
regardless of whether or not saved. On the other hand, pension benefits are taxed under
the consumption tax model.
86 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 101(c),
§ 102(a), 88 Stat. 297, 300.
87 Id. § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. at 299 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012)). For a historical
analysis, see Jonathan B. Forman, Origins of the Tax Expenditure Budget, 30 TAX NOTES
537, 537–45 (1986).
84
85
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Thus, the definition of a tax expenditure draws a distinction
between the ideal provisions of an income tax and the special or
preferential provisions that are exceptions to that ideal
structure. For example, according to the Joint Committee on
Taxation:
[T]he normal structure of the individual income tax includes the
following major components: one personal exemption for each
taxpayer and one for each dependent, the standard deduction, the
existing tax rate schedule, and deductions for investment and
employee business expenses. Most other tax benefits to individual
taxpayers are classified as exceptions to normal income tax law. 88

As we have seen, these exceptions from an ideal income tax
are routinely identified as tax expenditures by the Office of
Management and Budget and the Joint Committee on Taxation.89
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 does not, however,
actually specify the ideal structure of a tax law, so deciding
which provisions are special or preferential is necessarily a
matter of judgment, over which there is often much debate.90
Pertinent here, many tax experts would prefer if tax
expenditure estimates were based on a consumption tax ideal
rather than an income tax ideal.91 Under a consumption tax,
savings are not supposed to be taxed until they are spent (i.e.,
consumed). Consequently, using a consumption tax ideal would
lead to a quite different set of tax expenditure estimates. Indeed,
the tax expenditure associated with pensions would be zero (or,
to the extent of any “over-taxation” of pensions, negative).92

STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 3.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 45, at 203, 205 tbl.14-1; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at
2.
90 See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National
Budget, 22 NAT ’L TAX J. 244, 245 (1969); Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The
Tax Expenditure Budget—Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 528, 530 (1969);
Boris I. Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget—A Reply to Professors Surrey and
Hellmuth, 22 NAT ’L TAX J. 538, 538 (1969).
91 See Jonathan B. Forman The Impact of Shifting to a Personal Consumption Tax
on Pension Plans and Their Beneficiaries, in TAX REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 51, 56–57 (Dallas L. Salisbury ed., Employee Benefit
Research Institute 1997); see also PETER BRADY, INV. CO. INST., THE TAX BENEFITS AND
REVENUE COSTS OF TAX DEFERRAL 6 (2012), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/
ppr_12_tax_benefits.pdf (suggesting that current tax expenditure budgets vastly
overstate the tax costs of retirement savings).
92 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2004 app. at 140 tbl.2 (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2004PER/pdf/BUDGET-2004-PER.pdf. Pertinent here, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Tax
Treatment of Qualified Plans: A Classic Defense of the Status Quo, 66 N.C. L. REV. 315,
315 (1988); Norman P. Stein, Qualified Plans and Tax Expenditures: A Reply to Professor
Zelinsky, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225, 239 (1991); Edward A. Zelinsky, Qualified Plans and
88
89
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Certainly, the government has the power to eliminate or
curtail the tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs; but
should it? As we have seen, there are already a number of limits
on contributions and benefits (e.g., the $17,500 annual cap on
401(k)-type contributions). The question is really whether it
makes sense to toughen the current limits and/or impose new
limits on deferred savings. Proponents of comprehensive income
taxation tend to favor such tougher caps, while proponents of
consumption taxation tend to oppose tougher caps.
To be sure, a good deal of revenue could be raised from
curtailing the current tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and
IRAs. And certainly that revenue could be used for deficit
reduction, for cuts in marginal tax rates, or for additional
retirement savings subsidies for low- and moderate-income
households. Those are all worthwhile uses for additional revenue,
but if raising revenue is the goal, it is not clear that curtailing
the tax benefits for savings is the best way to raise revenue.
While the retirement savings tax benefits are among the largest
tax expenditures in the tax expenditure budget,93 curtailing them
might undermine our already fragile retirement system.
Historically, Congress has often let revenue needs drive
pension policy.94 Instead, it should be driven by genuine concerns
about how to ensure that our pension system will provide
adequate retirement incomes for all American workers.95
B. The Favorable Tax Rules for Annuities, Pensions, and IRAs
Could Be Better Targeted to Help Low- and Moderate-Income
Households
Many proponents of curtailing the tax benefits for annuities,
pensions, and IRAs believe that those benefits could be better
targeted to help low- and moderate-income households.96 In that
regard, there is no question that these tax expenditures are

Identifying Tax Expenditures: A Rejoinder to Professor Stein, 9 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 257, 257
(1991).
93 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., David A. Pratt, Pension Simplification, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 565, 566
(2002).
95 See, e.g., G.A. (Sandy) Mackenzie & Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming the
Second Tier of the U.S. Pension System: Tabula Rasa or Step by Step?, 46 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 631, 633 (2013).
96 See, e.g., Turner, McCarthy & Stein, supra note 61; GALE, supra note 81; Chuck
Marr, Nathaniel Frentz & Chye-Ching Huang, Retirement Tax Incentives Are Ripe for
Reform: Current Incentives Are Expensive, Inefficient, and Inequitable, CENTER ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm
?fa=view&id=4063; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M S IXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM 54–57 (2008).
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skewed in favor of high-income households. For example, Table 3
shows that the top quintile of households receive roughly
two-thirds of the tax benefits from the exclusion of pension
contributions and earnings.97 Meanwhile, the bottom quintiles
get hardly any tax benefits.
TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF THE EXCLUSION OF NET
CONTRIBUTIONS AND EARNINGS, BY INCOME GROUP, 2013

Share
Share of after-tax
income

Lowest

Second

Middle

Fourth

Highest

All

quintile

quintile

quintile

quintile

quintile

quintiles

2

5

9

18

66

100

0.4

0.7

0.8

1.2

2.0

1.4

Source: CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO . 4308, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR
TAX EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 15 tbl. 2 (2013),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_
DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf.

Accordingly, curtailing the tax benefits for retirement
contributions and/or benefits likely would reduce the proportion
of tax expenditures that goes to high-income households and
increase the relative proportion that goes to low- and
moderate-income households. Alternatively, replacing the
current system of exclusions and deductions with refundable tax
credits could also improve the distribution of benefits. However,
to the extent that these changes would limit the incentives that
business owners and managers have to offer retirement plans,
overall coverage might decline. All in all there are tradeoffs, and
the focus should be on designing a low-cost pension system that
will provide adequate retirement incomes for all American
workers.98
C. The Current System Is Already Too Complicated and Needs
to Be Simplified
One of the major problems with the current retirement
savings system is its incredible complexity. In addition to the
wide variety of annuity options, there are a plethora of

97 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO . 4308, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX
EXPENDITURES IN THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 15 tbl.2 (2013), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpendi
tures.pdf; see also Distribution of Tax Expenditures for Housing, Health and Retirement
Savings, TAX POL’Y CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/Tax_Expendit
ures_tables.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); T13-0295 Tax Benefit of Certain Retirement
Savings Incentives (Cash-flow Approach), TAX POL’Y CENTER (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/ numbers/displayatab.cfm?DocID=4041.
98 See, e.g., Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 15, at 6-43.

Do Not Delete

10/13/2014 4:23 PM

2014] Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions and Annuities

241

retirement plans including traditional defined benefit plans, cash
balance plans, money purchase pension plans, target benefit
plans, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, employee stock
ownership plans (ESOPs), SIMPLE plans, SEPs, IRAs, and Roth
IRAs. Every one of these plans has a different set of rules and
regulations, limits on contributions, vesting rules, and tax
advantages. The net result is bewildering complexity for
everyone. As a result, many analysts have called for
simplification.99
Pertinent here, we already have numerous limits on
retirement contributions and benefits, and extensive regulations
that govern annuities, pensions, and IRAs. As Congress thinks
about adding new limits and toughening existing ones, one hopes
that it also takes the opportunity to reform and simplify the
current system.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, there have been a number of proposals to
curtail the favorable tax treatment that is currently available for
annuities, pensions, and IRAs. Advocates of imposing tougher
limits on the tax benefits for annuities, pensions, and IRAs tend
to be interested in raising revenue for deficit reduction, for cuts
in marginal tax rates, or for subsidies for low- and
moderate-income households. These are worthy goals; however,
as Congress thinks about limiting the tax incentives for
annuities, pensions, and IRAs, it needs to be careful not to
undermine our already fragile retirement system.

99 See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 94; Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 15; David A.
Pratt, Focus on . . . Pension Simplification, 9 J. PENSION BENEFITS 8 (2002); Pamela
Perun & C. Eugene Steuerle, Reality Testing for Pension Reform 2 (May 6, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410797_
reality_testing_pension_reform.pdf.
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